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CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE
ever, the Court, in the interest of uniformity, should hold that Boys Markets
is applicable to the states. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.38
emphasized that national labor policy could not tolerate inconsistent state
and federal court enforcement and interpretation of labor contracts:
Incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of
federal labor law . . . . The dimensions of § 301 require the con-
clusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be para-
mount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is in-
herent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the
mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind
covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal
labor policy . . . . [T]he subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly
one that calls for uniform law."39
The field of labor law stands on the threshold of a new era that promises
consistent development on both state and federal levels. Broad policies of
national interest will be the predominant concern in any labor-management
controversy. Past errors and incompatible doctrines should be cast aside
and resurrected only in historical comment. The judiciary should not take
umbrage at emerging concepts alien to past interpretations. As Justice
Stewart noted, concurring in Boys Markets, "[w] isdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."' 40
ROBERT D. Rizzo
Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment Contracts not to
Compete within the Entire United States
The North Carolina Supreme Court has now put to rest the notion
that nationwide restraints on trade were per se illegal in North Carolina.
In Harwell Enterprises, Iw. v. Heim,- the supreme court upheld a re-
No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 673, 675-76 (1961);
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONs AcT 546 (1948). The NLRB honors this
distinction. Repeatedly it has said it will not adjudicate contract violations. At
least one commentator disagrees. Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions AgainSt
Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. Rlv. 303,
316 (1968).
"8 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
'Id. at 102-03.
Justice Stewart borrowed this quote from Justice Frankfurter. 398 U.S. at
255.
'276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970).
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strictive covenant in an employment contract in which the employee
covenanted that he would not compete with the corporation anywhere
within the United States for a period of two years. 2
The plaintiff-corporation was engaged in various business endeavors
including all phases of silk screen processing, plastics, importing and
various other ventures throughout the United States and brought this
action against its former employee for the violation of the restrictive
covenant.3 The case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court on a
demurrer which had been sustained by the court of appeals on the grounds
that the territory embraced in the restrictive covenant was too great.4 In
ruling upon the demurrer the supreme court accepted, inter alia, the allega-
tions that there was a valid written contract, that plaintiff-corporation
was engaged in this business throughout the United States, and that Heim
had acquired valuable trade secrets and technical processes, customer lists,
price information, and research and development data while employed by
plaintiff.5 The court said that "upon the allegations of the complaint,
which the proof may or may not sustain, the court should have over-
ruled both demurrers and permitted the defendants to answer and proceed
to trial of the case on its merits."6 The supreme court, therefore, held
Id. at 476, 173 S.E.2d at 317.
3 Id. The action was commenced against Heim, individually, for violating his
restrictive covenant in the employee contract; and against Heim and Ballard, a
codefendant, trading as Metro Screen Engraving Co. of Gastonia, for conspiracy
to violate the covenant
'6 N.C. App. 548, 170 S.E.2d 540 (1969). The court of appeals determined
that the mere allegation of business throughout the United States which needed
to be protected was not sufficient, and stated that it was incumbent upon plaintiff to
show that such a business exists and that the contract was necessary to protect
such legitimate interest.
276 N.C. at 478, 173 S.E.2d at 318.
0Id. at 480, 173 S.E.2d at 320-21. The supreme court in Harwelt apparently
felt that the burden rested upon the plaintiff to plead such facts in his complaint
that would show the covenant to be reasonable on its face. The issue before the
court on this demurrer was whether the complaint contained a plain and concise
statement of facts constituting a cause of action. What should the plaintiff be
required to plead to show that he has a cause of action? Under the pleading rules
applicable when this case was tried, the plaintiff needed not plead any more than
facts constituting a cause of action and a demand for relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled. He did not have to allege evidentiary facts, nor was he required to plead
the law. Furthermore, he was not required to anticipate and negate in advance the
defenses that the defendant may interpose. In Harwell the supreme court seemed
to vary these rules and require the plaintiff to plead more than would normally be
required. If the plaintiff in a Harwell situation is required to plead certain addi-
tional facts to indicate reasonableness, what of the many factors affecting reason-
ableness should he be required to plead? Why should not the burden fall on the
defendant, who arguably is in a better position to know if the covenant is un-
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that these allegations of the complaint constituted a valid cause of action.
This decision indicated that the covenant restricting employment through-
out the United States was not void on its face.'
The earlier North Carolina precedent concerning nationwide restraints
on trade in employment contracts has been unclear although it seems to
have limited the area of noncompetition more severely than the court
has done in Harwell.
The leading case prior to Harwell was Comfort Spring Corp. v.
Burroughs' in which the defendant-employee covenanted that for a period
of five years after termination of the contract by either party, he would
not directly or indirectly enter into the employ of or represent a certain
named competitor within the entire United States.' The court sustained
the defendant's demurrer and held that the restriction covering the entire
United States was void arid unreasonable as to territory, and was un-
necessary for the protection of the plaintiff.1"
The employee-defendant in Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris,:" cov-
enanted not to engage directly or indirectly in the same kind or similar
busirges$ as that of the plaintiff-corporation in Gastonia or in any other
town or city in the United States in which the plaintiff did or had sig-
reasonable as to him, to come forward with facts showing the covenant to be
unreasonable? A possible justification for the court's approach in Harwell is that
historically restraints of trade have been disfavored. Therefore, with no summary
judgment provision, the court, for the purpose of intercepting more quickly these
possibly unreasonable restraints has decided to require the plaintiff to plead the
scope of his business and facts showing that he was a legitimate interest to be
protected. The problem is that the supreme court has never articulated the reasons
for requiring the plaintiff to plead these things. Where does the plaintiff in a
Harwell situation look for guidance when he prepares his complaint? Under the
new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff apparently will not be
required to plead the additional facts as he had to do in Harwell. The emphasis
in the new rules is on notice pleading-giving the defendant notice of the nature
and basis of plaintiff's claim to enable him to answer and prepare for trial-with
the use of other pretrial procedures to disclose more precisely the basis of the claim
and define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. Fact interception is now
handled via the summary judgment procedure. See Sutton Y. Duke, 277 N.C. 94,
176 S.E.2d 161 (1970), for a decision interpreting N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
276 N.C. at 480, 173 S.E.2d at 320-21.
- 217 N.C. 658, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1940).
Id. at 659, 9 S.E.2d at 474.
10 Id. at 661-62, 9 S.E.2d at 475-76. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 276 (1955),
in which the Comfort Spring decision is cited in the list of cases that have held
nationwide restrictive covenants unreasonable. See also 2 J. STROlNG, NORTH CARo-
LINA INDEX 2d Contracts § 7 (1967), which cites Comfort Spring as authority for
the proposition that nationwide restraints are per se unreasonable and void in North
Carolina.
" 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying North Carolina Law).
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nified its intention to do business.12 Judge Dobie, speaking for the court,
said:
In Comfort Spring Corp. v. Burroughs, . . . defendant employee,
apparently a salesman, covenanted, inter alia, not to work for a certain
competitor anywhere in the United States for a five year period after
the termination of his employment with plaintiff-employer. The cov-
enant was -breached, but the court held that the covenant was void
because it was unreasonable in territorial extent .... 18
Arguably Judge Dobie interpreted Comfort Spring as requiring that the
restrictive covenant in Morris be declared void and unreasonable since
the period was unreasonably long and the territory covered was too vast."
In Welcome Wagon International, Inc. v. Pender" there was a cov-
enant by the employee-defendant which prohibited the employee from
engaging in business competitively with the employer in
(1) Fayetteville, North Carolina, (2) in any other city, . .. or other
place in North Carolina, in which the Company is then engaged in
rendering its said service, (3) in any city, . . . or village in the
United States in which the Company is then engaged in rendering its
said service, or (4) in any city ... or village in the United States in
which the Company has signified its intention to be engaged in render-
ing its said service.16
The covenant was declared void to the extent that it related to any place
in the United States where plaintiff was engaged or intended to carry on
business, but it was reasonable as to Fayetteville.1 The court in Pender
12 Id. at 696.
18Id. at 699.
14Id. at 694. Possibly Judge Dobie misconstrued the holding of the Comfort
Spring decision, as did the court of appeals and the defendant in Harwell. Comfort
Spring did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were ipso facto void
and unreasonable. However, Judge Dobie may still have reached the correct result.
The plaintiff in Morris alleged that he did business in many cities throughout the
United States, but there was no allegation or proof that the defendant-employee had
gained such trade secrets as would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the
employee was allowed to use them with another employer. Judge Dobie pointed
out in the opinion that no trade secrets passed from Welcome Wagon to Morris.
The procedural aspect of Morris-appeal from a denial of injunctive relief-was
different from that of Harwell--appeal from granting of a demurrer. It is in-
teresting to note that the court in Morris made findings of fact even though it was
an appeal from denial of injunctive relief.
1255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
"Id. at 246, 120 S.E.2d at 740.
17Id. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742. In considering the covenant the court said that
it was
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noted that "the court [in Comfort Spring] recognized, as valid, the rule
[reasonableness test] . . . but refused to restrain the defendant because
of plaintiff's failure to allege sufficient facts . . "1 The differences in
facts, allegations, and specific circumstances led to a result in Pender that
was different, though not conflicting, with that in Harwell. In Pender
the court certainly did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were
ipso facto void.
The defendants in Harwell had relied on Comfort Spring to support
their contention that the covenant in their contract was void because the
territory covered was unreasonable. However, the court in Comfort
Spring did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were ipso facto
unreasonable for the court there had expressly pointed out that "[t]here
is no allegation nor evidence as to the territory in which the defendant
is calling upon the plaintiff's customers .... In truth, there is no allegation
nor evidence as to over what territory the plaintiff's business extends." 9
Even though the defendant had acquired certain trade and confidential
information, the court indicated that the absence of the particular allega-
tion that plaintiff does business throughout the United States left it
no choice but to declare the covenant unreasonable for purpose of the
demurrer. Apparently the court felt that the absence of this allegation
indicated on the face of the complaint that plaintiff had no legitimate in-
terest that required protection throughout the entire United States.
Pender and Morris, likewise, would not support the plaintiff's con-
tention that a nationwide restrictive covenant should be enforced. In both
Pender and Morris there were allegations that plaintiff did business
throughout the United States. However, in Pender there was no allega-
without power to vary or reform the contract by reducing either territory
or the time covered by the restrictions. However, where as here, the parties
have made divisions of the territory, a court of equity will take notice of
the divisions the parties themselves have made, and enforce the restrictions
in the territorial divisions deemed reasonable.... It is patent that division
(l)-Fayetteville--is not unreasonable. Likewise it appears that divisions
(3) and (4)-any city or town in the United States in which the plaintiff
is doing, or intends to do business-are unreasonable-and will not be en-
forced. Whether (2) is reasonable is for the chancellor.
Id. The court in Pender applied the "blue pencil test"--since the parties had made
divisions in the territory themselves, the court could "pencil out" the unreasonable
areas and permit the reasonable areas to stand. The Pender case was up on a
demurrer, and, therefore, only the allegations of the complaint were before the
court. There was no allegation that valuable trade secrets and confidential informa-
tion was acquired by the defendant during the course of her employ.' 8 Id. at 249, 120 S.E.2d at 743. See note 6 supra.
10 217 N.C. at 661, 9 S.E.2d at 475.
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tion that the employee had acquired valuable trade secrets and confidential
information during the course of her employment.2 0 In Morris, there was
allegation that the employee had become acquainted with certain "methods,
systems, and trade usages"2' during the course of her employment, but
the court stated that "there were no deep trade secrets, and no highly
confidential information was given by Welcome Wagon to Morris."
22
The court in both cases apparently felt that the plaintiff did not have
legitimate interests that required protection throughout the United States.
In Harwell the plaintiff alleged that he did business throughout the United
States. This allegation coupled with the allegation that defendant Heim
had acquired valuable trade secrets that could irreparably damage the
plaintiff competitively, allowed the court to overrule the demurrer and
uphold the nationwide restrictive covenant. The combination of these
two allegations was absent in Comfort Spring, Pender, and Morris.
Various states have approached the problem of nationwide territorial
restraints on trade in several ways. A few states have antitrust statutes
specifically limiting the enforceability of contracts restraining anyone from
exercising a lawful trade, profession, or business. Included in this cat-
egory are Montana," North Dakota, 4 and Oklahoma,25 which prohibit any
such restrictive covenant, except where the covenantor is the seller of a
business who agrees not to compete within a specified county, city or part
thereof, so long as the vendee or his assignee conducts the business there-
in, or the seller is a partner who agrees not to compete in order to facilitate
dissolution of a partnership.26 California apparently prohibits post-
employment restrictions although it does permit the enforcement of agree-
ments that are ancillary to the sale of a business and its good will or inci-
dental to a partnership dissolution.27
"0 The court apparently felt that without this allegation the covenant would not
be reasonable. Thus, in effect, there would be no cause of action. See 255 N.C. at
249, 120 S.E.2d at 743.
21224 F.2d at 696.
" Id. at 701. This language indicates that "trade secrets" in and of themselves
are not sufficient. There must be "trade secrets" of the sort found in Harwell in
order that nationwide protection will be granted.
" MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to -809 (1967).
' N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959).
" OXLA. STAT. tit 15, §§217-19 (1961).
20 Note, Employment Contracts and Non Competition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL.
L.F. 61, 63.
" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600-02 (West 1964). But see Ingrassia v. Bailey,
172 Cal. App. 2d 370, 341 P.2d 370 (1959). (Enforcing employee's agreement not to
solicit former employer's customers whose identities were confidential.)
[Vol. 49
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There are some states which by judicial decision hold void a contract
restricting the employee beyond the scope of his original employment,
even though the employer's business extends further ;28 while a few states
apparently hold, without regard to particular facts, that any restraint that
covers at least an entire state is invalid.29 Several states support the rule
that a restrictive covenant not to compete is ipso facto void if unlimited
as to territory 0 Even where there is no limitation as to territory, or
territory is expressly made unlimited, however, the majority of juris-
dictions hold that the covenant is not ipso facto invalid 1 and apply the
test of reasonableness to the specific circumstances and facts of each case.32
Generally the nationwide restrictive covenant has been upheld where the
employer's business actually covered the United States and the breaching
employee had possession of "valuable trade secrets ''  of the employer.3
However, where it does not appear that the employer conducted a nation-
wide business or that the employee had garnered such secret or confidential
. See Comment, Contracts in Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants Not to
Compete, 21 Anx. L. REv. 214, 219 (1967).
" Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 51 S.E.2d 669 (1949);
Hubman Supply Co. v. Irvin, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 119, 119 N.E.2d 152 (C.P. 1953).
"' Vendo Co. v. Long, 213 Ga. 774, 102 S.E.2d 173 (1958) ; Magic Fingers, Inc.
v. Robins, 86 NJ. Super. 236, 206 A.2d 601 (Super. Ct. 1965) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
94, 125 (1955).
"Award Incentives, Inc. v. Van Rooyen, 263 F.2d 173' (3d Cir. 1959); Tus-
caloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williarms, 127 Ala. 110, 28" So. 669 (1899) ; Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 94, 130 (1955).
"- See, e.g., Afinot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 116-21, 141-236 (1955). See generally these
North Carolina cases: Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 158
S.E.2d 840 (1968) ; Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Griffin, 258 N.C. 179, 128 S.E.2d
139 (1962) ; Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 476 (1940) ; Scott v. Gillis,
197 N.C. 223, 148 S.E. 315 (1929).
" The use of the term "trade secrets" covers a broad area. General "trade
secrets" may or may- not b6 protected depending on' the circumstances. Ustially
secrets are protected when they are of'a spe6al 'type-secret t6dhnical processes
developed at gfeat expense. See generally Anrnot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 275 (1955) for
the'types of'trade secrets that are protected.
" See, e4, Irvington 'Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99,
46 A.2d 201 (1946); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 'Powers Film Prod., 189 App. Div.
556, 179 N.Y.S. 325, appeal denied, 190 App. Div. 970, 179 N.Y.S. 919 (1919);
Eagle ?Peritil ' Co. v. Jainseri, 135 Misc. 534, 238 N.Y.S: 49 (Sup. Ct. 1929). See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 275 (1955); 36 Am. Jk Monopolies § 79 (1941).
'The fact that the employment is of such a charact~riis to inform the
employee of business methods and trade secrets, which if brought to the
'kn6wl~dge of "a competitor, would prejudice the interests of the employer,
tends to give an element of reasonableness to'a contract that the employee.
.will not engage ii a'similar business for a limited time after the termination
of his employment, and is always regarded as a strong reason for upholding.'
the contract.
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trade information that could cause irreparable harm to the employer,
nationwide covenants are declared unreasonable.3 The individual factual
situation and the specific circumstances of each case generally seem to
determine whether or not the covenant will meet the required test of
reasonableness."8
This test of reasonableness is comprised of three elements-reason-
ableness as to the employer, as to the employee, and as to the public in-
terest. The reasonableness of each element is contingent upon the absence
or presence of a number of factors.8 7 As to the protection desired by the
employer, consideration must be given to the nature of the trade or business
involved, the nature of the employee's occupation, the nature of the skill
acquired by the employee during employment, the employee's contact with
customers, the employee's contact with and acquisition of trade secrets
and confidential information, and generally whether or not the employer
has a legitimate interest that requires protection. As to the reasonableness
of the covenant with respect to the employee, consideration must be given
to possible economic hardship to the employee and his family, the in-
convenience to the employee resulting from the necessity of changing occu-
pation or residence, and the nature of the skill acquired by the employee
during employment."8 As to the public interest, consideration must be given
to the interference with the utilization of the employee's skill and pro-
ductivity, the possibility of a consequent shift of competition or creation
of a monopoly,39 the possibility of the employee becoming a public charge,
and the creation of opportunity of employment. Each of the elements must,
also, be considered in relation to the duration of the covenant and the
territory restricted by the covenant. 0 In order for the restrictive covenant
"' See, e.g., Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Lake Erie Eng'r Corp., 132 F.2d 403
(2d Cir. 1942); McCluer v. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp., 62 F.2d 426 (10th Cir.
1932) ; Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Nenmich, 169 Mo. 388, 69 S.W. 355 (1902).
" In Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 158 S.E.2d 840 (1968),
the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that time and area must be con-
sidered in determining reasonableness but neither is conclusive of the validity of the
covenant.
" See Comment, note 28 supra at 215-17; Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 625, 647 (1960); Note, Validity and Enforceability of
Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 WEs. Rzs. L. REv. 161 (1964). For
excellent discussions of these three elements of reasonableness and factors that
influence them, see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247 (1963) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 141-
236, 275-77 (1955) ; Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 46-154 (1955).
"' For an example of this resulting situation see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 141-236
(1955).
291d., See generally authorities cited note 37 supra.
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to be reasonable under a certain factual situation, there must be some
combination of the above factors to make each element reasonable in
respect to the duration of the covenant and the territory restricted by the
covenant.4" In balancing these elements, courts have found that the
covenant will be enforceable if it is ancillary to the employment contract;
if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the person-
employer-for whose benefit the restraint is imposed; if it does not impose
undue and unreasonable hardship on the person restricted-employee; and
if it is not injurious to the public interest.42
When analyzing the reasonableness test, it does not seem impossible,
illogical, or unlikely that courts in North Carolina, under the appropriate
factual situations, could find a nationwide restrictive covenant reasonable
and enforceable. However, the Harwell decision is the first in North
Carolina to uphold such a covenant.
With the growth of nationwide business, increased use of nationwide
restrictive covenants will follow.
Because of the increased technical and scientific knowledge used in
business today, the emphasis placed upon research and development,
the new products and techniques constantly being developed, the
nation-wide activities (even world-wide in some instances) of many
business enterprises, and the resulting competition on a very broad
front, the need for such restrictive covenants to protect the interests
of the employer becomes increasingly important. If during the time
of employment new products are developed and new activities are
undertaken, reason would require their protection as well as those in
existence at the date of the contract, and to a company actually en-
gaged in nationwide activities, nationwide protection would appear to
be reasonable and proper.4
But what of the employee bound by this restrictive covenant? Either he
must change occupations or leave the country; certainly neither alternative
is desirable. There must of necessity, be a balancing process between the
interests of the employer and employee. In traveling this path of bal-
• These factors are easy to list. The difficulty arises when one tries to apply
these factors to specific circumstances. See generally authorities cited in note 37
supra. The cases cited in those discussions will be an aid in determining what
factors are relevant in a particular situation and covenant.
"' See generally authorities cited in note 37 supra; Sineath v. Ratzis, 218 N.C.
740, 12 S.E.2d 671 (1940). Note, Employment Contracts and Non Competition
Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247 (1963);
Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1456, 1468 (1920).
"276 N.C. at 480-81, 173 S.E.2d at 320.
1971]
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ancing, the courts have adopted rules which reflect the whole evolution
of industrial technological advances, business methods, social values, and
popluation. In Harwell, North Carolina took the path of least net in-
justice.
MICHAEL GUNTER
Torts-Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance
Should a court of equity close a forty-five million dollar cement plant,
thereby destroying the jobs of over three hundred workers and depriving
the county of important tax revenue, in order to prevent comparatively
minor damages1 to nearby property? This was the question that con-
fronted the New York Court of Appeals recently in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.2 The cement plant emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations which
neighboring property owners claimed injured their lands. The owners
filed -several suits asking the court to restrain the operation of the plant
as a nuisance and to award money damages for past injury. The trial
court found' that the operation of the plant did indeed constitute a
nuisance, even though the plant was equipped with the most effective
pollution control devices available, and that plaintiffs had been substantially
injtired. Damages for past injuries were awarded, but the court refused
to issue an injunction because of the great hardship it would bring upon
defendant and the comnunityY The appellate division affirmed.4
The court of appeals agreed with the lower courts that closing the plant
was too drastic a remedy but disagreed with the manner in which'the
lower courts had avoided such remedy. With one judge dissenting, the
court reversed the order of the trial court and instructed that an in-
junction* be issued unless defendant paid plaintiffs' permanent damages.
S-fch relief, "said-.the court, would do justice between the parties as it
would fully redress the economic loss to plaintiffs' properites without being
overly- oppressive to defendant. Citing United States v. Causby,5 the
' , Approximately 535 dollars per month.
"2 - 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). This decision con-
solidated appeals handled separately by the appellate division.
' Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup, Ct.
f967).
o "-Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d' 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968); Meliak v. -Atlantic Cement Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 578, 295 N.Y:S.2d 622
(1968) (mem.).
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
[Vol. 49
